The generation of realistic data sets in a Combinatorial Auction may be a challenging problem. Wellformed data sets are very useful in the evaluation of algorithms trying to solve the winner determination problem. In this paper a general data set generation scheme is presented, both from an algorithmic and economic point of view. As a case study, a possible auction setting is discussed where the goods on sale are connections between points in space.
I. INTRODUCTION
COMBINATORIAL Auctions (CAs) are interesting both for Economics and Science Computer researchers. In a CA a bidder can place unrestricted bids, economically evaluating the combination of sets of items. With respect to a "traditional auction", a bidder may take into account complementarities (i.e., V(A and B) > V(A) + V(B), being V(X) the bidder's valuation of good X on sale) and substitutabilities (i.e., V(A and B) < V(A) + V(B)). This makes it possible to design auctions mechanisms that are economically more efficient.
CAs seem to be well suited for problems such as airport time slots allocation [1] , machine time scheduling [2] , real estate [3] , delivery routes [4] .
A number of technical problems have to be solved before unrestricted CAs can be used in practice. For n items on sale, a bidder can place an offer of any subset of interest, with up to 2n different bids for the auctioneer. Two issues are those of how to synthetically express a bid and how to communicate it to the auctioneer efficiently (see [5] ). Another fundamental problem is that of winner determination, aka the allocation problem: i.e., after receiving a set of (combinatorial) bids, decide how to allocate the goods in order to satisfy the constraints (a good to at most one bidder) and to maximize the total bid taker's payoff.
Although this is an NP-hard to approximate problem ( [6] , [7] ), in practical cases the situation may be substantially better, leading various researchers to the proposition of polynomial time approximation algorithms (e.g. [8] ): this paper aims to contribute in the experimentation of these theoretical results with variable size data sets reflecting the characteristics of the real algorithm's input data.
As far as we know, the only attempt to provide a "realistic" suite for generating test sets is the work by Leyton-Brown et al. [9] , in which they consider a number 'C. Gallo is with the Dept. of Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, University of Foggia, Italy (phone: 39-0881-753708; fax:
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of potential application areas for CAs and propose bid generation mechanisms that try to reflect the underlying structural as well economic factors, but probably overlooking a number of economic issues that would greatly help in the generation of realistic data sets.
In this paper we concentrate on such economic issues and devise some high level guidelines to generate realistic bids. In particular, in Section II the properties of goods at auction and those of the bidders are investigated, while in Section III a general scheme for bid generation in structured domains is discussed. Finally, we briefly mention directions for further work.
II. ECONOMIC PARAMETERS IN REALISTIC CAs
Let S denote the set of items on sale and let I = ISI be the cardinality of the set S. Also, let B denote the set of bidders submitting bids to the auctioneer. Here we analyze the parameters B and I that characterize realistic auction settings, and the distribution of the value of items and size of bidders.
Bidders number The parameter B can vary greatly if bidders are firms instead of individuals. In the case of firms, substantially B<100; in a typical business-to-consumer auction, instead, B can be up to 10,000 (if, for example, we consider an auction taking place over the Internet). A more interesting measure is the number of bidders relative to I, reasonably being BII < If the set of items on sale is "structured", other considerations may apply as well. For instance, when the items are paths in space, which is our case study in Section IV, it is reasonable that the value of a path P may affect the value of paths that have points in common with P (e.g., the "value" of a side connection may depend on the value of the backbone connection which the side one originates from). In these cases, the market values may be generated using some sort of "structural computations" (as we shall see in Section IV).
Bidders' size For individual bidders the size is the income (and the value of items never exceeds it), while for companies is the total assets (with debt possible but excluded for financial markets limitations). In case of small value items, the size of bidders is usually not relevant (we assume unlimited budget); but if the ratio average bidder size I average item value tends to be small, then an important role is played by the size distribution function. Size, in general, follows a left skewed distribution, because both individual income and firm size are asymmetrically distributed (see [10] ). In this case, it is possible to use the support [0,oo) to avoid truncations, even though this is not economically realistic. As an alternative, it may be assumed support 0 to 1 billion dollars for income and 0 to 100 billion dollars for assets. Once a left skewed distribution has been fixed, we only need to pick the distribution parameters in such a way that the ratio AS ( = average bidders' size) / A V ( = average value of items) is of the desired value (and possibly inversely correlated to the number of auctioned items).
Operational 
III. BID GENERATION IN STRUCTURED DOMAINS
In this section we sketch the general ideas for the generation of realistic bids in structured domains, i.e., when the goods on sale can be seen as the element of a "space"' equipped (at least) with a distance function. These ideas will be made more precise in the next Section, where we address our case study.
First of all, a bidder must be assigned a goal that she will pursue subject to her size (and hence budget) limitations. Clearly, goals are highly dependent on the nature and structure of the items on sale. As an example, if items can be represented as the edges of a graph (as in the case study of Section IV), then a reasonable goal is that of acquiring a (simple) path joining two nodes. Once the goal has been fixed, the actual bids can be produced. For both goal generation and bidding a certain degree of randomness must be introduced to model the facts that: (1) different bidders may be interested in different sets of items, and that (2) different bidders can make different valuations of the same set of items.
Let us consider the goal generation problem in more details. Let S be a subset of S; S should include the "most valuable"' items in S. Each bidder selects a random subset of S and ranks all the elements in S according to their average distance from the elements in the random subset selected. Clearly, different bidders will have different rankings with high probability. Now, given a budget and a ranking of the items, we are able to generate a goal for a bidder as follows: we start by selecting the highest ranked item e and form a bid by adding as many items as possible among those "close" to e. Clearly, if e is too much expensive, we try with the next highest ranked item. Obviously, as pointed out at the beginning of this Section, much fine tuning is necessary as to precisely define the goal in a number of cases.
Once the items to be included in the bid have been determined, the actual price offered is "essentially" the sum of their market values. However, the bidder's valuation of a single item needs not coincide with its market value (generated according to the above scheme), as it also depends on subjective evaluations. Yet it is reasonable to regard the market value of an item as the indicative price an individual or a firm is willing to pay for that item. We can take "subjective elements" into account by simply perturbing the market value. As an example, we can generate bidder's valuations by sampling from a (quite narrow) normal distribution with mean the market value. A similar approach (but possibly using a left skewed distribution) can be adopted to produce super additive valuations of sets of items.
IV. GENERATING REALISTIC DATA SETS
In this section we specialize the economic parameters and the high level scheme of Sections II and III to the generation of realistic test sets for the allocation of the rights to use railroad tracks. A railroad network is an example of a structured domain, and we will use the underlying properties to both assign values to the items on sale and to generate the bids.
As in [9] , the first step is the generation of the railroad map. We propose a different algorithm to generate families of graphs that, in our opinion, better reflects the way actual railroad networks have developed, i.e., by the merging of local and/or regional (or even national) networks, which were originally independent or very weakly interconnected.
A.Railroad network generation Given an Euclidean graph G, let the distance between two different connected components G1 and G2 of G be defined as the minimum, over all pairs (a,b) such that aEG1 and bEG2, of the distances between a and b. The network generation algorithm is the following.
1. Randomly place n1 points on a square region and connect each point with its k closest neighbors. example railroad network, with parameters n, = 13, k= 1, and n2= 3, according to the above algorithm. The reason why we make each connected component bi-connected is that a railroad network hardly contains articulation points, except possibly for nodes with degree 1 (which we add as the last step of our algorithm).
Here the goods on sale are the edges of the network; however, the network generation algorithm presented above is parameterized by the number of nodes (i.e., cities) rather than edges. It is possible to prove that, when k= 1, the number of edges generated does not exceed 2n1 + n2 > ni + n2= n (number of items). We will assume n1 < 50 and n2 < 10 with either k= 1 or k= 2; for the number of bidders, we shall fix B = min{2I, 100}.
The rules according to which we assign market values to the items are the most crucial of the whole bid generation procedure. We begin by observing that the value of a train path depends on the expected number of passengers that travel on it in the unit of time. In turn, this depends on the importance of the nodes (cities) touched by that path. The value of a city does depend on "external" (with respect to the railway system) factors but also on the degree of the corresponding node and, in a recursive way, from the value of the nodes which is connected to. Hence we assign market values to the edges of the graph by first assign values to the nodes. After that, we assign an edge e = (c1, c2) the value V(e) = [V(cl) + V(c2)]d(c1,c2), where V denotes the market value function (for both nodes and edges) and d(-,-) denotes the Euclidean distance.
The problem is thus that of assigning values to the cities. Our approach is to assign to node i the value of the i-th component of the normalized eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue of maximum absolute value of the adjacency matrix of the graph. The argument (which is commonly used in different contexts, for instance to compute the "authority weight" of web sites [11] is that the importance of a city is given by the importance of the cities it is connected to. If we ignore factors external to the railway systems, the value can then be computed by the iterated powers method applied to the adjacency matrix, and this can be easily proved to converge to the principal eigenvector. In Fig.2 we show the values this method gives to the nodes (cities) of the example network of Fig. 1 . According to the general scheme of Section II, the size of bidders is generated using a left skewed distribution (either lognormal or Pareto). The average size can be taken (parametrically) up to ten times the average value of the items on sale.
B.Bid generation The actual bid generation follows the general guidelines outlined in Section III. Let S denote the set of the first 10 to 20 most valuable edges of the graph. A bidder i randomly selects a subset Si of S of cardinality LIS11h], 746 via where h = 2, 3 typically. As already pointed out, Si will be used to rank all the edges in the graph. The rank of an edge is computed by calculating its average distance from the edges in Si; here we define the distance between two edges el and e2 as the minimum distance in the graph between endpoints of el and e2. The rank of an edge is then given by the rank of the corresponding average distance in the set of all the computed distances.
Given a budget and an ordering of the edge set, a bidder formulates a bid according to the algorithm given below. We assume that the goal of the bidder is to get a set of edges of total length greater than a minimum required value, and whose ranks are as highest as possible.
C.Algorithm "Bid generation " 1. Select the next highest ranked edge (among those not yet considered). If the rank is below a given threshold, we assume failure for the current bidder. 2. Select a few other edges that form (together with the edge devised at step 1) a path in the graph. This path will form the "backbone" of the bid. 3. Select a few edges that represent connections from and to the backbone. Each connection, together with the backbone, will form a separate bid. Clearly the bids are (implicitly) xor-ed, since they all share the backbone. The value associated to a bid is given by the sum of the bidder's valuations of the edges included in the bid. These valuations are determined by slightly (and randomly) perturbing the market prices. 4. If the budget constraint is violated, step 3 is repeated.
If this happens repeatedly, the algorithm goes back to step 1. 5. (Success) The value of the bid generated can be increased by a small random amount (not more than 10% of the value computed so far) as a function of the rank of the edges included. This can actually produce super additive bids.
V.FURTHER WORK
Currently we are implementing a suite for the generation of realistic data sets in structured domains. One such domain is the allocation of paths in space discussed in this paper (a different domain we are working with is real estate). The goal is to use this data to perform in-depth analyses of the performance of a number of approximation algorithms that have been proposed in the literature. A related goal is to get insights that will possibly help to devise more time-and-space-efficient allocation algorithms that closely approximate the optimum values on realistic data.
